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ABSTRACT 
  Fetal homicide laws criminalize killing a fetus largely to the same 
extent as killing any other human being. Historically, the common law 
did not generally recognize feticide as a crime, but this was because of 
the evidentiary “born-alive” rule, not because of the substantive 
understanding of the term “human being.” As medicine and science 
have advanced, states have become increasingly willing to abandon 
this evidentiary rule and to criminalize feticide as homicide. 
  Although most states have recognized the crime of fetal homicide, 
fourteen have not. This is largely the result of two independent 
obstacles: (judicial) adherence to the born-alive rule and (legislative) 
concern that fetal homicide laws could erode constitutionally 
protected reproductive rights. 
  This Note explores a variety of fetal homicide laws that states have 
adopted, demonstrating that popular opinion has shifted toward 
recognizing this crime. It then directly confronts the objections that 
have prevented other states from adopting such laws: it first reviews 
the literature suggesting that the born-alive rule should be abandoned, 
as it is an obsolete evidentiary standard; it then argues that 
constitutionally protected reproductive liberties can be reconciled 
with, and in fact augmented by, punishing the killing of a fetus as a 
homicide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.1 
The question of whether killing a fetus constitutes a homicide 
has been considered and debated for centuries. History’s legal giants 
have weighed in on the issue,2 countless law review articles and notes 
have tackled it,3 and politicians at all levels have struggled with it.4 
 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of 
the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law 
(Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 2. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *125–26 (“For if a woman is quick 
with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby 
the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by 
the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so 
atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanor.”); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, 
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Belknap Press 1968) 
(1257) (“If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, if 
the foetus be already formed or quickened, and especially if it be quickened, he commits 
homicide.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, Clarke & 
Sons 1809) (“[I]f a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a 
dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no murder . . . .”). 
 3. E.g., Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal 
Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 392 (2007) (addressing the legal personhood of fetuses); 
Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal 
Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 625 (1987) (comprehensively surveying the historical 
treatment of feticide and arguing that the born-alive rule was purely evidentiary); Tony 
Hartsoe, Person or Thing—In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina 
Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169, 237 (1995) (“It is difficult to say what the status of the fetus is 
in North Carolina. While there is some case law and several statutes on the subject, there is an 
overall paucity of law—case or statutory—that defines the legal status of the fetus.”); Roger J. 
Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 767, 777 (2007) (“The criminal law, at least in recent years, has been moving briskly 
toward the recognition of the personhood of the unborn.”); Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of 
Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1178 
(2007) (“If you take a hard look around, you might get the sense that our society is drifting 
toward a bifurcated narrative of the human fetus. One line of the fetal narrative is epitomized 
by the restructuring of criminal codes in order to protect fetuses from acts of 
violence. . . . [T]here is, of course, another line of the fetal narrative. This is the fetus’s near-
absolute subordination to maternal liberty . . . .”); Laura E. Back, Note, Improperly Performed 
Abortion as Fetal Homicide: An Uneasy Coexistence Becomes More Difficult, 18 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 119 (2007) (observing that “someone who assists a woman in terminating a 
pregnancy can be charged with murder” and exploring the “constitutional bases for challenging 
such a result”); Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of 
Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY 
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Historically, largely because of technological limitations, the 
consensus5 was that a fetus could not be killed (in the legal sense) 
unless it was first born alive.6 In the twentieth century, though, 
medical technology advanced significantly,7 and this consensus began 
to erode.8 Beginning in the 1970s, American jurisdictions have 
gradually moved toward a new consensus, and, as of 2009, thirty-six 
states punish killing a fetus as a form of homicide.9 
Analytically, this topic is a difficult one—on one hand, it is 
hardly controversial to take the position that a fetus is a human 
organism10 (though the legal personhood of a fetus is hotly debated11) 
and that, consequently, the killing of a fetus should not go entirely 
unpunished. But, on the other hand, those advocates of 
constitutionally protected reproductive rights balk at classifying all 
unborn children12 as “human beings” for the purposes of homicide 
statutes.13 The challenge, then, becomes appropriately protecting 
pregnant mothers and their unborn children while still maintaining 
reproductive freedoms. 
 
L. REV. 1845, 1880 (2000) (“State legislatures interested in creating fetal homicide statutes 
should focus on the pregnant woman as victim, rather than on the fetus itself.”). 
 4. See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1328 (“The rule [that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a 
homicide] has been accepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that 
has considered the question.”). 
 6. E.g., White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57, 57 (Ga. 1977) (“In order to convict for the murder 
of a newly born baby it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the child was born alive and 
had an independent and separate existence from its mother, and that it was slain by the 
accused.” (quoting Logue v. State, 32 S.E.2d 397, 397 (Ga. 1944))). 
 7. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 8. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) 
(“Medical science certainly has progressed to the point of making the ‘born alive’ rule 
obsolete.”). 
 9. Nat’l Right to Life, State Homicide Laws that Recognize Unborn Victims, 
http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 10. Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325 (“An offspring of human parents cannot reasonably be 
considered to be other than a human being, and therefore a person, first within, and then in 
normal course outside, the womb.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable 
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 
299–303 (2008) (discussing the debate regarding the personhood of human embryos). 
 12. This Note uses “unborn child” and “fetus” interchangeably; no moral or ethical import 
is intended to attach to either term. 
 13. See, e.g., Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent Developments: The Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215, 235 (2002) (“[W]hile the Act may not legally affect the 
right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion debate and the legal battles of the 
next century.”). 
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This issue was thrust back into the public discourse with the 2007 
death of Jenna Nielsen, a North Carolina mother of two.14 Nielsen 
was eight months pregnant when she was murdered, and her unborn 
son perished soon after.15 Because North Carolina does not recognize 
the killing of an unborn child as a homicide, Nielsen’s murderer could 
not be charged for the death of the fetus.16 The story gained traction, 
the community held vigils, and the public called for legal change. 
In the aftermath of Nielsen’s death, Kevin Blaine, Nielsen’s 
father, used this public clamor to lead a fight to reform the North 
Carolina homicide statute.17 Blaine sought an amendment to the 
statute that would recognize unborn children as potential victims of 
homicide,18 and state representatives and senators ultimately 
introduced bills to this end.19 If the legislature passed such an 
amendment and enacted a new law, North Carolina would become 
the thirty-seventh state to recognize this crime, leaving only thirteen 
others that have not done so.20 
But the legislature must weigh very carefully a countervailing 
concern: the potential erosion of constitutionally protected 
reproductive freedoms. Many pro-choice advocates understandably 
worry that fetal homicide laws encroach on reproductive freedoms 
and could ultimately result in the outlawing of abortion altogether.21 
Couched in these terms, it is unsurprising that many oppose the 
passage of a fetal homicide law, not because they do not wish to 
protect the life of a fetus, but because the issue implicates the politics 
of reproductive rights.22 
 
 14. Jenna Nielsen Murder Investigation, WRAL.COM, June 22, 2007, http://www.ncwanted. 
com/ncwanted_home/story/1525864. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra note 23. 
 17. Erin Coleman, Pregnant Mom’s Slaying Could Help Change Fetal Homicide Law, 
WRAL.COM, June 29, 2007, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1547056. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Marisol Bello, Slain Woman’s Family Wants N.C. Fetal Homicide Law, USA TODAY, 
July 8, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-08-carrier_N.htm. 
 21. See, e.g., id. (“Janet Crepps, a staff attorney for the Center for Reproductive Rights, 
says fetal homicide laws are part of a broader agenda by abortion opponents to create legal 
rights for a fetus in order to set precedents that will help them ban the procedure.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235 (“While the [Unborn Victims of 
Violence] Act disclaims its power to affect abortion rights, the substance of the UVV appears to 
contradict the fundamental premises of abortion law . . . .”). 
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Similar to this political objection to legislative recognition of 
fetal homicide, the judiciary faces an obstacle of its own. Interpreting 
homicide statutes to exclude the killing of a fetus generally results 
from applying the common law “born-alive” standard.23 Under this 
standard, as its name indicates, a child is not capable of being killed, 
in the legal sense, unless it has first been born alive.24 A rule of 
necessity in previous centuries,25 the standard reflects the mystery that 
surrounded pregnancy and the child’s development in the womb.26 
The courts that have extended the scope of homicide statutes to reach 
the killing of a fetus have had to address and overcome this common 
law hurdle.27 
Two distinct obstacles thus work in concert to frustrate the 
institution of fetal homicide laws: the first is the political concern that 
treating feticide28 as homicide would erode constitutionally protected 
reproductive freedoms; the second is judicial reluctance to abandon 
the born-alive standard. Though fetal homicide is a morally and 
philosophically complex issue, this Note operates on a more practical 
level by confining itself to addressing only these two fundamental 
obstacles. 
After synthesizing states’ various approaches to these 
impediments,29 this Note lays out methods and rationales for 
overcoming these hurdles. First, relying on Clarke D. Forsythe’s oft-
cited work,30 this Note addresses the judicial, common law obstacle by 
showing that the born-alive standard was never intended to 
substantively define the term “human being.”31 In so doing, it argues 
that this standard, properly understood, should not prevent a 
 
 23. See, e.g., State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (“We conclude that defendant may 
not be prosecuted under N.C.G.S. § 14–17, as it now exists, for the killing of a viable but unborn 
child.”). 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 575 (“[T]he health of the child in utero could not be 
established unless and until the child was observed outside the womb.”); see also infra Part I.B. 
 26. See infra Part I.A. 
 27. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 735–36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Oklahoma, 
by means of this decision, joins a minority of two states whose courts have expressly rejected the 
ancient, yet obsolete, born alive rule.”). 
 28. Throughout this Note, “feticide” refers to the killing of an unborn human child, 
irrespective of how the law treats that killing. “Fetal homicide” refers to treating this killing 
similarly to a traditional homicide. 
 29. See infra Parts II–III. 
 30. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 625. 
 31. See infra Part IV.A. 
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homicide statute from reaching the killing of a fetus. Second, this 
Note argues that fetal homicide laws do not meaningfully encroach on 
constitutionally protected reproductive rights but rather complement 
and even augment those rights.32 Accordingly, the desire to protect a 
woman’s constitutional right to an abortion should not counsel 
opposition to fetal homicide legislation. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I briefly explores the 
historical treatment of feticide, including both the meaning of 
“quickening” and the born-alive standard. This Note then discusses 
the treatment of feticide in the states: Part II explores the laws of a 
variety of states that recognize feticide as homicide, and Part III then 
considers the laws of those states that do not. Finally, Part IV 
confronts the rationales discussed in Part III, explaining, first, why the 
born-alive standard should be abandoned and, second, why fetal 
homicide laws do not impinge on reproductive freedoms. 
I.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF FETICIDE 
Historically, feticide was governed entirely by the born-alive 
standard: a fetus that was never born alive could not have been killed 
in the legal sense.33 This Part first considers the medical circumstances 
that produced this standard and then explores how the law has 
treated feticide historically. 
A. Medical Standards 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the born-alive 
standard became entrenched in the criminal law, medicine was still in 
its infancy.34 Much of the human body’s operation was simply beyond 
the scientific understanding of the day. As a result, in the context of 
pregnancy and fetal development, physicians relied exclusively on 
 
 32. See infra Part IV.B. 
 33. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 1989) (“[T]he common law rule [is] that a viable 
fetus cannot be the subject of murder unless it was born alive and subsequently died of injuries 
inflicted prior to birth.”). For a comprehensive survey of the historical developments of feticide 
and the born-alive standard, see generally Forsythe, supra note 3. Courts considering the born-
alive rule have frequently relied on Forsythe. E.g., State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511, 513 (Kan. 
1988); Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Ky. 2004); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 
732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
 34. See Forsythe, supra note 3, at 571 (discussion the “primitive” state of medicine at the 
time the born-alive standard developed).  
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external observations35 to verify the vitality of the unborn child.36 
Thus, without external signs of life, it was presumed that the fetus was 
not living.37 
Although doctors of the time generally understood how a woman 
became pregnant, they were at a loss to determine at an early stage 
whether a given woman was in fact pregnant.38 Doctors could observe 
external signs that manifest in the first few months of pregnancy, 
including the ceasing of periodic discharge and the firming of the 
breasts, but these observations were indefinite.39 Without proof of the 
existence of the fetus itself, it was impossible to determine that these 
signs were not caused by an unrelated occurrence—illness of the 
mother, for instance.40 
Because medicine could not explore or understand the body’s 
internal functioning, a woman was not unequivocally “pregnant” until 
the existence of the fetus was ascertainable externally.41 This occurred 
when the fetus “quickened”; that is, when the mother could feel the 
fetus move, usually in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy.42 It was 
only with this observable animation that medicine—and the law—
deemed the child to be living.43 In an age of primitive medicine, this 
fetal movement was the first significant event of a pregnancy. 
Though quickening provided proof that the fetus was alive, it 
remained impossible to ascertain how healthy the child was while still 
in utero.44 In this age, pregnancies by no means guaranteed successful 
births or healthy infants. Complications were commonplace and 
 
 35. See id. (explaining that fetal movement, halfway through gestation, is the “most 
undoubted” sign of pregnancy). 
 36. See id. at 573 (discussing, specifically, fetal movements and heartbeat). 
 37. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“The high rate of 
stillborn deliveries and miscarriages in earlier times created a presumption that an unborn child 
would die in the process of childbirth.”). 
 38. See id. (“[U]ntil recent advances in medical technology, there was no way to determine, 
prior to the point of ‘quickening’ (when the baby is felt to move), whether the fetus was alive in 
the womb.”). 
 39. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 571 (quoting VALENTINE SEAMAN, THE MIDWIVES 
MONITOR AND MOTHERS MIRROR 25 (New York, Isaac Collins 1800)). Indeed, it was not until 
the early twentieth century that modern pregnancy tests were developed. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 573. 
 42. Id. at 571. 
 43. Id. at 573. 
 44. Id. at 575. 
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miscarriages were much more frequent than in modern times.45 
Accordingly, one could not declare with any certainty that a specific 
child was healthy until that child was born.46 A live birth 
demonstrated not only that the child had been healthy while in the 
mother’s womb but also that the infant was able to survive the 
stressful and demanding event of the birth itself. Once born alive, the 
mystery shrouding the child’s in utero development and health faded, 
and the baby had successfully navigated the perils of pregnancy. 
B. The Treatment of Feticide 
The imprecise and undeveloped medical knowledge of 
pregnancy was reflected in the homicide laws of the time. If a 
pregnant woman was battered and the fetus was then miscarried or 
stillborn, there was no way to prove that the unborn child died as a 
result of the battery rather than from natural causes.47 The legally 
required but-for causation was lacking: because physicians could not 
say that the fetus would have survived but for the assailant’s attack, 
no homicide could ever be proved. 
The requirement of live birth thus became central to charging 
the homicide of an unborn child. The birth demonstrated that the 
child was alive and healthy and capable of surviving outside of the 
mother’s womb.48 Sir Edward Coke, writing in the seventeenth 
century, provided one of the most oft-cited statements of the born-
alive rule. Coke wrote: 
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth 
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in 
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great 
misprision [misdemeanor], and no murder: but if the childe be born 
alive and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder: 
for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, 
when it is born alive.49 
 
 45. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing a “high rate 
of stillborn deliveries and miscarriages”). 
 46. See Forsythe, supra note 3, at 575 (discussing common complications arising during 
pregnancy that rendered it difficult to determine that a fetus was alive). 
 47. Id. at 576. 
 48. See id. at 575 (“[L]ive birth was required to prove that the unborn child was alive and 
that the material acts were the proximate cause of death, because it could not otherwise be 
established if the child was alive in the womb at the time of the material acts.”). 
 49. COKE, supra note 2, at 50. 
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Thus, if an assailant battered a pregnant woman who then gave birth 
to an injured—but living—child, the assailant could be prosecuted for 
murder if the child died because of the injuries it had suffered as a 
result of the assailant’s attack.50 This was the case even if the infant 
lived only for a moment after birth before succumbing to its injuries. 
The fact that the child was alive when born was sufficient to provide 
the otherwise lacking causation: because the live birth retroactively 
demonstrated that the child was healthy when attacked, it could then 
be determined that the child would have lived but for the assailant’s 
battery. 
Thus, the born-alive standard was necessary, in the absence of 
advanced medical knowledge and technological innovation, to prove 
that a criminal act ended an otherwise viable life.51 It is this standard 
that U.S. courts and legislatures inherited52 and that still is upheld in 
some jurisdictions.53 
II.  THE LAWS OF STATES THAT RECOGNIZE FETICIDE AS 
HOMICIDE 
Killing a fetus54 is punishable as a homicide in the majority of 
American jurisdictions,55 a result that states have reached through 
judicial decisions, legislation, or both. Although the practical results 
of the states’ approaches may be similar, the variations in the laws 
suggest how states that have not criminalized fetal homicide might 
prohibit and penalize it. Moreover, exploring the issues that arise 
within the context of existing feticide laws demonstrates that 
criminalizing feticide is not an all-or-nothing proposition; rather, 
judges and legislators can tailor the crime to best fit the political and 
moral views of the state’s citizens. 
 
 50. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 291. 
 51. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 579 (“[T]hroughout the period of the common law, both the 
quickening doctrine and the born alive doctrine related entirely to evidence of life.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 52. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (“The rule [that the 
destruction of a fetus in utero is not a homicide] has been accepted as the established common 
law in every American jurisdiction that has considered the question.”). 
 53. See infra Part III. 
 54. These laws do not apply to abortions. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Nat’l Right to Life, supra note 9 (indicating that thirty-six states recognize fetal 
homicide). 
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A. Criminalizing Feticide through Judicial Decision 
In some states, the killing of a fetus has been classified as 
homicide through judicial interpretation of the general homicide 
statutes. Reaching such a result requires state high courts to interpret 
the term “person” or “human being” in homicide statutes in such a 
way that includes an unborn child.56 Although this definition may 
seem broad from a historical viewpoint, such an interpretation 
indicates that the courts are striving to interpret the laws in a way that 
accurately reflects modern scientific understanding.57 
The born-alive standard was the common law rule for centuries, 
and every American jurisdiction that considered the issue accepted 
it.58 Accordingly, to interpret the term “human being” in a homicide 
statute in a way that includes an unborn child requires courts to 
specifically abandon the born-alive standard. Some American courts, 
including Oklahoma’s high criminal court, have adopted this 
interpretation, and have thus recognized the obsolescence of the rule. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in Hughes v. State,59 
confronted the born-alive standard in a manslaughter case involving a 
drunk driver.60 While intoxicated, the defendant drove into oncoming 
traffic, collided with another vehicle, and killed the victim’s unborn 
child.61 At the time of the accident, the victim was nine months 
pregnant; the fetus was just four days shy of the due date.62 The 
defendant was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter and, on 
appeal, argued that because the child was not born alive63 she could 
not be charged with criminal homicide.64 
The court first set the stage for its holding by noting that it “has 
the right and duty to develop the common law of Oklahoma to serve 
 
 56. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Thus, the term 
‘human being’ in Section 691—according to its plain and ordinary meaning—includes a viable 
human fetus.”). 
 57. E.g., id. at 732 (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and technology have 
abolished the need for the born alive rule.”). 
 58. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 & n.4 (Mass. 1984). 
 59. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
 60. Id. at 731. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The child was delivered via emergency cesarean section and had a faint heartbeat at the 
time of delivery, though the child had neither blood pressure nor brain activity. Id. at 732. The 
court dismissed the argument that the faint heartbeat satisfied the born-alive rule and instead 
confronted the rationale of the rule directly. Id. 
 64. Id. at 731. 
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the evolving needs of [the] citizens” and that it would thus construe 
the homicide statute consistent with this duty.65 Because “[t]he 
purpose of [the homicide statute] is, ultimately, to protect human 
life,” the court explained, and because “a viable human fetus is 
nothing less than human life,” the term “human being” in the 
Oklahoma homicide statute, according to its “plain and ordinary 
meaning,” necessarily includes a viable human fetus.66 The court thus 
looked to the terms of the statute and assigned to them their plain 
meaning as understood in light of modern reason and knowledge. The 
judges discarded the centuries-old born-alive rule, even though courts 
had long applied it.67 
In Hughes, the court deemed the unborn victim “viable,”68 
meaning that it was capable of surviving independently outside of the 
mother’s womb.69 Thus, although the Hughes court had no occasion to 
specifically determine whether the viability of the fetus was a 
required element of the term “human being” in the Oklahoma 
statute, viability was nevertheless an important factor in the court’s 
analysis.70 
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached a similar holding in 
Commonwealth v. Morris,71 another case involving a viable unborn 
child.72 Although observing that “there [was] no need for [the born-
alive rule]” because the fetus’s viability was provable,73 the Morris 
court noted the “definite medical distinction” between an embryo 
and a viable fetus.74 Thus, like in Hughes, the Morris court considered 
the fetus’s viability when holding that the death of the unborn child 
came within the scope of Kentucky’s general homicide statute.75 
 
 65. Id. at 733. 
 66. Id. at 734. 
 67. Id. at 736 (“[W]e reject the born alive rule and hold that a viable human fetus is a 
‘human being’ against whom a homicide as defined in Section 691 may be committed.”). 
 68. Id. at 732. 
 69. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “viable” to mean 
“capable of living, especially outside the womb”). 
 70. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at 731 (“We now abandon the common law approach and hold 
that whether or not it is ultimately born alive, an unborn fetus that was viable at the time of 
injury is a ‘human being’ which may be the subject of a homicide . . . .”). 
 71. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004). 
 72. Id. at 659. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 660. 
 75. Id. The court further noted that it would likely never have the occasion to specifically 
consider whether a previable fetus was also included in the term “person” in the Kentucky 
CURRAN IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:23:22 PM 
1118 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1107 
Although the Hughes and Morris courts both included viability 
as a factor in determining whether a fetus was within the limits of the 
homicide statute, other courts have considered viability entirely 
irrelevant. In Bailey v. State,76 the Missouri Court of Appeals 
considered whether the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction 
for killing the unborn child of a woman who was three months 
pregnant could be sustained.77 The fetus was unquestionably 
previable,78 and the defendant was aware of the woman’s pregnancy.79 
The Missouri court held that, because of a state statute declaring that 
all life begins at conception,80 the court could not “base [its] 
interpretation of the term ‘person’ in the homicide statutes on the 
viability of the unborn child.”81 Accordingly, Missouri law considers 
an unborn child of any gestational age a person under the homicide 
statute, regardless of viability.82 
The Missouri legislature’s finding that “[t]he life of each human 
being begins at conception”83 and its command that “the laws of [the] 
state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of 
the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities available to other persons”84 provided the 
authority that compelled the Bailey court to hold that the state’s 
homicide statutes protect a previable fetus.85 Though this statute 
ultimately broadened the reach of the homicide laws to include the 
killing of a fetus, the legislatures of other states have been even more 
explicit about their intent to expand their homicide statutes. 
 
homicide statute because the state’s feticide law, which makes any fetus from conception 
onward a potential victim of homicide, took effect nine days after the oral arguments in this 
case. Id. at 661. 
 76. Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 77. Id. at 53. 
 78. “A fetus generally becomes a viable child between the sixth and seventh month of its 
existence . . . .” Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 660 (quoting Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 
1955)). 
 79. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 53. In fact, the woman was pregnant with the defendant’s child. 
Id. 
 80. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000). 
 81. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55. 
 82. Id. 
 83. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1). 
 84. Id. § 1.205.2. 
 85. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55. 
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B. Criminalizing Feticide through Legislation 
In several states, legislatures have addressed the criminal 
treatment of feticide rather than relying on courts to resolve the issue 
through the construction of general homicide statutes. This 
movement is relatively new, with many such statutes taking effect in 
the 1980s or later.86 
1. Motivations for Enactment.  Legislatures often criminalize 
feticide as a form of homicide in response to court decisions that held, 
by applying the born-alive rule, that a fetus could not be a victim 
under the general homicide laws. For instance, in 1986 the Minnesota 
legislature enacted a statute that imposes a mandatory sentence of life 
in prison for anyone who murders an unborn child in the first 
degree.87 The legislature specifically enacted the statute to overturn a 
then-recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision that adopted the 
born-alive rule.88 In that decision, State v. Soto,89 the court held that 
the unborn child victim—who was just two weeks short of full term—
was not a human being within the meaning of the Minnesota 
homicide provisions.90 
Additionally, legislatures have also enacted fetal homicide laws 
as a result of public outcry following particularly heinous crimes 
involving the death of unborn children. One well-known instance of 
this legislative reaction is the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act 
of 2004,91 popularly known as Laci and Conner’s Law.92 Named in 
memory of Laci Peterson and her unborn son, Conner, this federal 
fetal homicide statute provides that causing the death of or injury to 
an unborn child constitutes a separate offense under a variety of 
federal criminal laws.93 
 
 86. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 2003). 
 88. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Minn. 1990); Forsythe, supra note 3, at 564. 
 89. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985). 
 90. Id. at 630. 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). 
 92. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, § 1, 118 Stat. 568, 
568 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 note (2006)) (“This Act may be cited as . . . ‘Laci and Conner’s 
Law.’”). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). Scott Peterson, Laci’s husband and Conner’s father, was 
convicted of killing both his wife and unborn child in 2004, Peterson Guilty of Murder, 
CNN.COM, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/11/12/peterson.verdict, and was 
subsequently sentenced to death under California law, Peterson Sentenced to Death for Wife’s 
Slaying, CNN.COM, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/16/peterson.case. 
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2. Fetal Homicide Statutes.  Just as legislators’ motivations for 
enacting fetal homicide statutes are varied, so too are the forms the 
statutes take and their respective levels of specificity. Some statutes 
are painstakingly specific in defining exactly which potential homicide 
victims the law protects,94 whereas others are vague,95 leaving the bulk 
of the definitional task to the state courts.96 The various methods state 
legislatures have employed demonstrate the variety of legislative 
approaches available and the ability of lawmakers to tailor legislation 
to reflect the political and moral attitudes of their constituents. 
 a. Comprehensive Regime.  In overruling State v. Soto, the 
Minnesota legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory regime to 
criminalize fetal homicide.97 The statute begins by defining an 
“unborn child” as “the unborn offspring of a human being conceived, 
but not yet born,”98 and then defines in detail specific crimes involving 
either injury to or the death of an unborn child.99 This exhaustive 
legislative approach to fetal homicide leaves little, if any, substantive 
role for the courts to play in construing and applying the statute. 
The statute’s comprehensive nature prevailed in the courts: five 
years after Soto and four years after the enactment of these fetal 
homicide laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the new 
statutory scheme against equal protection and vagueness challenges.100 
As a result of that case, which involved the death of a twenty-eight-
day-old embryo,101 the same court that had previously held that a 
viable fetus of eight-and-a-half gestational months was not a victim of 
homicide102 validated statutory language making it murder to kill an 
 
Although the federal law, enacted in 2004, was conceived prior to Laci and Conner’s deaths in 
2002, the intense media coverage and the public’s general disgust at the murders helped to 
inspire renewed congressional interest in enacting a fetal homicide statute. Bush Signs ‘Laci and 
Conner’s Law,’ FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115825,00. 
html. Similarly, following the death of his daughter, Kevin Blaine and others pressured the 
North Carolina legislature to amend the state’s homicide statutes to include unborn children as 
potential victims. Bello, supra note 20; see also supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra notes 97–111 and accompanying text. 
 95. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2006) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”). 
 96. See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text. 
 97. 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 388 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 609.266–.2691 (2006)). 
 98. Id. § 609.266(a). 
 99. Id. §§ 609.2661–.269. 
 100. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. 1990). 
 101. Id. at 324. 
 102. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985). 
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embryo of less than one gestational month.103 Though the court 
opined that the legislature “has enacted very unusual statutes which 
go beyond traditional feticide, both in expanding the definition of a 
fetus and in the severity of the penalty imposed,”104 it ultimately 
acknowledged that “the role of the judiciary is limited to deciding 
whether a statute is constitutional, not whether it is wise or prudent 
legislation. . . . [The justices] do not sit as legislators with a veto 
vote . . . .”105 
Texas has adopted an approach similar to Minnesota’s by 
defining an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an 
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until 
birth.”106 The legislature further defines homicide as “caus[ing] the 
death of an individual.”107 By explicitly identifying which fetuses are 
protected (in this case, all), the legislature effectively eliminates the 
need for judicial interpretation of the statute.108 
Like the Minnesota court in Merrill, a Texas court of appeals 
upheld a defendant’s murder conviction under this statute for causing 
the death of a four-to-six-week-old fetus.109 Answering the 
defendant’s contention that the statute was unconstitutionally vague 
for not distinguishing between a viable and nonviable fetus, the Texas 
court stated, “The Texas legislature . . . chose not to incorporate fetal 
viability in the capital murder statute . . . . When a woman’s privacy 
interests are not implicated, the legislature may determine whether, 
and at what point, the life of her unborn child should be protected.”110 
The implication is that the legislature had in fact made that 
determination, and, so long as the statute was constitutional, the court 
would not judge the lawmakers’ wisdom.111 
 
 103. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 324. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 321. 
 106. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2008). 
 107. Id. § 19.01(a). 
 108. See Lawrence v. State, 211 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the plain 
language of the statute and noting that it “clearly states a fetus is an individual from the moment 
of fertilization, placing no limitation on the stage of development of the fetus”). 
 109. Id. at 885. 
 110. Id. at 892. These rights were implicated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), in 
which the Supreme Court did distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses in the abortion 
context, id. at 160. The Texas court in Lawrence distinguished between the mother herself 
ending the life of a fetus through legal abortion and a third party ending the life of a fetus 
through homicide. Lawrence, 211 S.W.3d at 892. 
 111. See Lawrence, 211 S.W.3d at 890 (deferring to the policy judgments of the legislature). 
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 b. Statutory Imprecision.  Although states like Texas and 
Minnesota have relatively specifically defined which unborn children 
are protected by the state’s homicide laws, other legislatures have 
enacted imprecise statutes that necessarily rely on the judiciary to 
construe and apply them. In striking contrast to the Minnesota 
legislature’s fetal homicide regime that consists of several specific 
offenses spread across multiple sections of the state’s penal code,112 
California’s fetal homicide law consists merely of a three-word 
amendment to the state’s general homicide statute.113 In 1970, in 
response to the California Supreme Court’s adherence to the born-
alive rule in Keeler v. Superior Court,114 the California legislature 
inserted the words “or a fetus” into the state’s general homicide 
statute,115 which reads, “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”116 
Although this amendment expressly indicated the legislature’s 
intent for the homicide statute to reach the killing of some unborn 
children, it fell to the California courts to determine which unborn 
children were covered by the term “fetus.”117 Considering this issue in 
1976, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that 
section 187 applied only to viable fetuses, despite the lack of any 
explicit reference to viability in the statute itself.118 But, seventeen 
years later, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, directly 
contradicted the Second District.119 The Fourth District held that, 
 
 112. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266–.2691 (West 2003). 
 113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 historical and statutory notes (West 2008) (explaining that 
the 1970 amendment added the phrase “or a fetus” after “human being” in defining murder). 
The amendment also added two subsections to prevent the feticide law from reaching cases of 
legal abortion, id., and thus was actually longer than three words. 
 114. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). 
 115. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). 
 116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187. 
 117. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501–02 (Ct. App. 1976) (“[S]ection 187, as 
amended, does not define fetus nor is it consistent with other parts of the Penal Code in which it 
is located. . . . In view of the gaps and inconsistencies on both sides of the issue, we rely on 
general legal principles interpreted in the light of the factual situation with which the statute 
purportedly deals.”), abrogated by Davis, 872 P.2d at 591. 
 118. Id. at 502. (“Legally and factually, a non-viable fetus does not possess the capability for 
independent existence and has not attained the status of independent human life. Logically, one 
cannot destroy independent human life prior to the time it has come into existence. . . . We, 
therefore, construe section 187 as making its protection coextensive with the capability for 
independent human life, a concept embraced within the term viability.”). 
 119. People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 104 (Ct. App. 1993) (“The courts may not restrict 
the application of the fetal murder statute to limit the mother’s interest in continuing her 
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although an unborn child must have progressed beyond the 
embryonic stage, thus satisfying the plain meaning of the term 
“fetus,” the child need not be viable.120 It was not until 1994, almost a 
quarter century after section 187 was amended to include the term 
“fetus,” that the Supreme Court of California finally resolved the 
issue. In People v. Davis,121 the Supreme Court of California adopted 
the decision of the Fourth District, holding, “[T]he Legislature [can] 
criminalize murder of the postembryonic product without the 
imposition of a viability requirement” so long as “the unborn 
offspring [is] in the postembryonic period . . . . [that] occurs in 
humans seven or eight weeks after fertilization.”122 
Thus, it took California courts nearly two-and-a-half decades to 
precisely define which unborn children are protected under the 
homicide statute. This timeline stands in stark contrast to the 
Minnesotan experience, in which the state supreme court, just four 
years after it had adopted the born-alive rule, affirmed a statutory 
scheme that made it murder to kill a twenty-eight-day-old embryo.123 
3. The Role of Knowledge and Intent.  Finally, when drafting fetal 
homicide statutes, legislators must address the problematic issues of 
knowledge and intent. Because a pregnant woman is not always 
obviously pregnant, one can imagine a scenario in which a criminal 
defendant charged with the homicide of an unborn child could deny 
knowing—or could actually not know—that the woman was 
pregnant.124 For these situations, legislators must determine whether 
to impose something akin to strict liability on defendants, or instead 
to require intent to harm the fetus as an element of the crime. As with 
other feticide issues, states have come down on both sides. 
In Illinois, for instance, the fetal homicide statute incorporates an 
actual-knowledge requirement, and courts apply the requirement 
strictly. Initially, Illinois’s fetal homicide statute required only that 
 
pregnancy and the state’s interest in protecting fetal life to include only viable fetuses. We 
respectfully reject Smith’s requirement that a fetus be viable in order to be [murdered].”). 
 120. Id. The embryonic stage lasts until the seventh or eighth gestational week. Id. 
 121. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). 
 122. Id. at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990) (considering the 
defendant’s contention that “it is unfair to impose on the murderer of a woman an additional 
penalty for murder of her unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may 
have been aware of the pregnancy”). 
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the defendant “knew, or reasonably should have known under all the 
circumstances, that the mother was pregnant.”125 In 1986, the 
legislature replaced the statute’s part-subjective, part-objective 
measure of knowledge with the more stringent requirement that the 
defendant “knew that the woman was pregnant” at the time of the 
crime.126 Thus, the Illinois legislature determined that actual 
knowledge of the woman’s pregnancy should be a required element 
of the crime of “Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child.”127 
The Appellate Court of Illinois recognized and applied this 
actual-knowledge requirement in People v. Gillespie.128 In that case, 
the prosecution neglected to definitively prove that the defendant had 
actual knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy,129 despite the fact that the 
mother was seven months pregnant and the defendant was the father 
of the child.130 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction for intentional homicide of an unborn child,131 
explaining, “The defendant’s knowledge of pregnancy is an essential 
element of the offense. The [1986] change in the statute reflects 
legislative concern that something less than actual knowledge would 
be used to convict someone of this serious crime.”132 
Contrary to the fairly rigorous requirement that the Illinois 
legislature imposed, the Minnesota statute demands somewhat less 
than actual knowledge, as State v. Merrill demonstrates.133 In 
Minnesota, “[m]urder of an unborn child in the first degree,” 
punishable by a mandatory life sentence,134 requires only that the 
 
 125. People v. Gillespie, 659 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 9-1.1 (1981)). 
 126. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(a)(3) (West 2002). 
 127. Id. Lesser crimes, including voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child, id. at 5/9-2.1, 
and involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide of an unborn child, id. at 5/9-3.2, do not 
require actual knowledge of the mother’s pregnancy. 
 128. People v. Gillespie, 659 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 129. Id. at 16 (“In short, there is a failure of proof. . . . Taking the State’s evidence in its 
most favorable light, we do not see how it can be said the defendant’s knowledge of Cook’s 
pregnancy was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 130. Id. at 15. 
 131. Id. at 16. 
 132. Id. at 15. 
 133. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990) (“The possibility that a female 
homicide victim of childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter may not 
safely exclude.”). 
 134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 2006) (“Whoever does any of the following is 
guilty of murder of an unborn child in the first degree and must be sentenced to imprisonment 
for life . . . .”). 
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defendant act with the “intent to effect the death of the unborn child 
or of another.”135 The Merrill court upheld the constitutionality of this 
statute, despite the defendant’s contention that “it is unfair to impose 
on the murderer of a woman an additional penalty for murder of her 
unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may 
have been aware of the pregnancy.”136 The court explained, 
The fair warning rule [of the Due Process Clause] has never been 
understood to excuse criminal liability simply because the 
defendant’s victim proves not to be the victim the defendant had in 
mind. . . . The possibility that a female homicide victim of 
childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter 
may not safely exclude.137 
Thus, in Minnesota, so long as the defendant intended to kill 
someone, the courts can sustain a conviction for the first-degree 
murder of a fetus. 
*          *          * 
Despite taking a variety of approaches, each of the states 
discussed in this Part, and states like them, treat the wrongful killing 
of an unborn child as a homicide. A minority of American 
jurisdictions, however, have not similarly reformed their laws. 
III.  THE LAWS OF STATES THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE FETICIDE AS 
HOMICIDE 
Though the majority of American states consider the killing of a 
fetus to be a homicide, fourteen do not.138 Historically, the failure to 
criminalize feticide was often a result of judicial interpretation of 
“person” or “human being” in the relevant homicide statute: by 
staying faithful to the born-alive rule, courts declined to extend the 
coverage of homicide laws to fetuses. To illustrate these decisions’ 
underlying rationale, Section A explores representative cases. 
 
 135. Id. § 609.2661(1). 
 136. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323. 
 137. Id. 
 138. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Montana, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
See Nat’l Right to Life, supra note 9 (listing the thirty-six states that have some form of fetal 
homicide laws). 
CURRAN IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:23:22 PM 
1126 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1107 
But no matter how the judiciary interprets and applies the 
common law, the legislature can always codify new standards and 
definitions. Accordingly, any failure to criminalize feticide is equally a 
result of legislative inaction. Section B thus examines and critiques 
legislative rationales for not enacting fetal homicide laws. 
A. Judicial Justifications for Continued Adherence to the Born-Alive 
Rule 
Several courts, most prominently the Supreme Court of 
California in Keeler v. Superior Court,139 have held that a fetus does 
not fall within the scope of a state’s general homicide statute. In 
Keeler, the defendant was charged with murder after he attacked his 
pregnant ex-wife and purposefully killed her unborn child.140 The 
defendant’s intention to kill the child was undisputed, evidenced by 
his declaring that he was “going to stomp [the fetus] out of [her].”141 
Doctors confirmed that the attack caused the unborn child’s death.142 
Despite the defendant’s intention to kill the unborn child, the 
California court determined the defendant’s actions did not constitute 
murder under the homicide statute.143 The court examined the 
legislative history and noted that the legislature intended the statute 
to encapsulate the “settled common law meaning” of the term 
“human being” at the time the statute was enacted in 1850.144 Because, 
according to the court, the common law definition of “human being” 
was “a person who had been born alive,” the legislature “did not 
intend the act of feticide . . . to be an offense under the laws of 
California.”145 
The court explained that only the legislature, not the courts, had 
the power to deviate from the common law definition of “human 
being”: “For a court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time 
has now come to prosecute under section 187 one who kills an unborn 
but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise 
 
 139. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). 
 140. Id. at 619. The defendant’s ex-wife was between seven and eight-and-a-half months 
pregnant. Id. at 619 n.1. 
 141. Id. at 618. 
 142. Id. As a pathologist determined, the fetus died from severe fracturing of the skull and 
the consequent cerebral hemorrhaging. Id. 
 143. See id. at 624 (holding that California’s homicide law does not prohibit “killing an 
unborn fetus”). 
 144. Id. at 622. 
 145. Id. 
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of construing it.”146 Thus, the common law born-alive rule persevered, 
and the defendant could not be prosecuted for the homicide of the 
unborn child.147 
As discussed, Keeler was overruled by a legislative amendment 
to section 187 less than one year after the case was decided.148 
Nevertheless, this case provides a salient example of a court’s 
reasoning, made all the more striking by the extreme nature of the 
facts. Moreover, the reasoning the Supreme Court of California 
employed in Keeler is typical of other courts that have considered the 
issue and have upheld the born-alive rule.149 
B. Political Justifications for Declining to Enact Fetal Homicide 
Legislation 
The endurance of the born-alive standard is equally a result of 
legislative inaction as it is of judicial reluctance to modify the scope of 
homicide statutes. The political arguments against fetal homicide laws 
reflect a concern that criminalizing fetal homicide is the first step 
down a slippery slope that will ultimately lead to the banning of a 
woman’s right to a legal, controlled abortion.150 Opponents worry that 
 
 146. Id. at 625–26. 
 147. The California court also held that, even if it were inclined to hold that “human being” 
included a fetus, the state could not charge the defendant in this case with murder because 
applying the definition retroactively would violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 626–30 
(explaining that retroactive implementation would run afoul of the Due Process Clause’s 
traditional notice requirement). 
 148. See supra note 114–116 and accompanying text. 
 149. One similar decision that does continue to operate as controlling precedent is the North 
Carolina case State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989). In that case, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina held that the state homicide statute did not actually define “murder.” Id. at 1–2 
(“Murder under [that statute] is murder as defined at common law.”). Referencing the historical 
discussion in Keeler, the court then asserted that, because “[i]t is beyond question that . . . the 
killing of a viable, but unborn child was not murder at common law,” neither was it murder 
under the North Carolina statute. Id. at 2. Like their California counterparts, the North 
Carolina judges held that altering the scope of the homicide statute was purely the prerogative 
of the legislature. Id. at 4. 
  Other states have also employed this sort of reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Trudell, 755 
P.2d 511, 516 (Kan. 1988) (“[I]f it is the desire of the people in Kansas to give the same 
protection to a fetus as it gives to a human being, it is the legislative branch which is the proper 
forum to resolve the issue.”); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 780–81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) 
(per curiam) (“Although we find that the ‘born alive’ rule is archaic and should be abolished in 
prosecutions brought under the negligent homicide statute, the abolition of the rule is a matter 
for action by the Legislature.”). 
 150. E.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, (July 31, 1996) 
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/gen/16530res19960731.html (“[The ACLU has] serious 
reservations about legislation designed to protect fetuses, because it can endanger women’s 
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recognizing fetuses as potential homicide victims is a step toward 
imbuing fetuses with full legal personhood, which would necessarily 
curtail a woman’s reproductive liberties.151 This Section describes 
these arguments and their supporting logic, and Part IV.B then offers 
a response. 
Many abortion rights advocates, although recognizing the need 
to punish feticide, object to the implications of statutes that 
criminalize these killings to the same degree as other homicides.152 
They maintain that granting the unborn child personhood in the 
homicide context153 would necessarily strengthen the fetus’s legal 
rights in the abortion context. These rights would be strengthened, 
they argue, despite the fact that feticide statutes often specifically 
disclaim the ability to impinge on abortion rights.154 Various 
commentators have advanced such an argument in response to the 
federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004,155 including the 
following: 
 
rights by reinforcing claims of ‘fetal rights’ in the law. Anti-choice organizations have long 
promoted fetal protection legislation as one prong of their campaign to eliminate the right to 
choose. . . . Passage of fetal protection laws gives anti-choice forces a propaganda coup and a 
launching pad for arguments to restrict abortion.”); Do Fetal Rights Limit Mothers’ Rights?, 
STATE LEGISLATURES, June 2002, at 6, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/SLJune2002p6.pdf 
(“Those on the other side fear that laws to protect a fetus could infringe on a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion. Pro-choice advocates say such laws grant a fetus legal status distinct from 
the pregnant woman—possibly creating an adversarial relationship between a woman and her 
baby.”); NARAL Pro-Choice Mont., HB 730: The Fetal Homicide Act, http://www. 
prochoicemontana.org/voting_hb730.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (“If the goal is to more 
severely punish crimes against pregnant women, there are better ways. . . . There is no need, 
aside from undermining Roe v. Wade, to define the fetus as separate from the woman.”); Nat’l 
Conference of State Legislatures, Fetal Homicide, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ 
health/fethom.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (“Those on the other side feel that laws to protect 
a fetus could become a ‘slippery slope’ that could jeopardize a woman’s right to choose an 
abortion.”). 
 151. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (“For the stage subsequent to viability, 
the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, 
and even proscribe, abortion . . . .”). 
 152. See sources cited supra note 150. 
 153. Not all statutes actually grant fetuses personhood. California’s homicide statute, for 
instance, specifically distinguishes between a human being and a fetus: “Murder is the unlawful 
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 
2008). 
 154. For example, the Minnesota statute separates feticide from abortion: “Sections 
609.2661 to 609.268 [the sections defining the crimes against the unborn] do not apply to any act 
described in section 145.412 [the section defining legal abortion].” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.269 
(West 2003). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). 
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While the Act disclaims its power to affect abortion rights, the 
substance of the UVV appears to contradict the fundamental 
premises of abortion law—that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not include fetuses in the definition of “person”—
by punishing violence against fetuses by third parties as harshly as 
violence against human beings. . . . [W]hile the Act may not legally 
affect the right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion 
debate and the legal battles of the next century.156 
Several members of Congress who opposed the Unborn Victims 
of Violence Act echoed this concern. During a Senate floor debate in 
March 2004, Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold stated, 
I will oppose H.R. 1997, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act . . . . I 
join with . . . the supporters of this bill in condemning acts of 
violence against women, including pregnant women. . . . I believe 
that acts of violence against pregnant women are deplorable and 
should be punished severely. Congress has taken and should 
continue to take steps to protect women from violence and 
prosecute those who attack them. But I am concerned that by 
recognizing the fetus as an entity against which a separate crime can 
be committed, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act may undermine 
women’s reproductive rights as set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Roe v. Wade.157 
Similarly, after President Bush signed the act into law in April 2004, a 
spokesman for Senator John Kerry responded: 
John Kerry strongly supports making it a federal crime to commit an 
act of violence against a pregnant woman. He agrees with the vast 
majority of Americans who want tough punishment for anyone who 
would commit such heinous crimes and know we can do so without 
undermining a woman’s right to choose.158 
In addition to concerns regarding the potential of fetal homicide 
laws to undermine a woman’s constitutionally protected right to an 
abortion, opponents of these laws have argued that focusing on the 
harm to the fetus wrongly detracts attention from the harm to the 
mother.159 Similarly, some have argued that imbuing a fetus with full 
 
 156. Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235. 
 157. 150 CONG. REC. S3149 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 158. Bush Signs ‘Laci and Conner’s Law,’ supra note 93. 
 159. Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in 
North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 128 (2006). 
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legal personhood necessarily reduces the personhood of the mother.160 
For instance, condemning calls for fetal homicide laws in Canada, one 
Canadian pro-choice activist asserts, “If we give any legal rights to a 
fetus, we must automatically remove some rights from women, 
because it’s impossible for two beings occupying the same body to 
enjoy full rights.”161 She continues, “If we try to ‘balance’ rights [of the 
unborn child and the mother], it means the rights of one or both 
parties must be compromised . . . .”162 Faced with such arguments 
defending mothers’ constitutional rights and legal personhood, 
legislative reluctance to enact comprehensive fetal homicide statutes 
seems reasonable. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS 
The principal purposes of homicide laws are to prevent and 
punish the extreme antisocial behavior that is the taking of another’s 
life for no justifiable cause. To be effective, these laws should classify 
taking a human life as a homicide even if the victim is unborn. 
Criminalizing feticide would not only hold accountable those who end 
the life of a fetus but would also augment the reproductive freedoms 
guaranteed to women. Setting out this argument, Section A addresses 
the born-alive rule and Section B then responds to concerns of the 
opponents of fetal homicide laws. 
A. Why States Should Abandon the Born-Alive Rule 
Several courts have invoked Sir Edward Coke’s statement of the 
born-alive rule163 to support the proposition that, at common law, a 
child was not a human being unless and until it had been born alive.164 
But this understanding of the born-alive rule is misguided, as one 
 
 160. E.g., Elizabeth Spiezer, Comment, Recent Developments in Reproductive Health Law 
and the Constitutional Rights of Women: The Role of the Judiciary in Regulating Maternal Health 
and Safety, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 509 (2005) (“[T]o protect the rights of all women, American 
laws must prioritize each woman’s autonomous interests above a historically determined 
maternal role.”). 
 161. Joyce Arthur, Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, The Case Against a “Fetal 
Homicide” Law, http://www.arcc-cdac.ca/fetal_homicide_law.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 164. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 622 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (holding that 
the murder statute only applies to children born alive); see also Forsythe, supra note 3, at 603 
(“Throughout [the Keeler opinion], the court assumed that the rule was a substantive element at 
common law, which designated the unborn child as non-human.”). 
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scholar, Clarke D. Forsythe, convincingly demonstrates.165 As Part I.B 
illustrates, the born-alive rule was evidentiary in nature, adopted to 
address the problems of proving causation when the victim of the 
homicide was an unborn child; it was not intended to be a substantive 
definition of “human being.”166 As Forsythe explains, “[A]t common 
law, the rule was entirely an evidentiary standard, mandated by the 
primitive medical knowledge and technology of the era . . . the rule in 
its origin was never intended to represent any moral judgment on the 
criminality of killing an unborn child in utero.”167 
Nevertheless, Sir Coke’s rule has persevered and is often 
considered the expression of the common law view on the homicide of 
unborn children.168 But, in the thirteenth century, well before Sir 
Coke’s time, another English jurist, Henry de Bracton, published 
quite a different statement regarding fetal homicide: “If one strikes a 
pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, 
if the foetus be already formed or quickened, and especially if it be 
quickened, he commits homicide.”169 In direct contradiction of Coke’s 
statement, Bracton’s view supports the contention that the born-alive 
rule was merely an evidentiary standard. Although Bracton’s view 
may have been abandoned because it proved practically infeasible,170 
its mere existence demonstrates that, as long ago as the 1200s, at least 
one major jurist considered an unborn child to be a potential victim of 
homicide from the time of conception, not just from the time of birth. 
That the born-alive rule was adopted for evidentiary purposes 
does not, as some modern courts have held,171 define an unborn child 
 
 165. See generally Forsythe, supra note 3 (demonstrating the evidentiary nature of the born-
alive rule). 
 166. Id. at 564. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620 (“Perhaps the most influential statement of the ‘born 
alive’ rule is that of [Coke]. . . . [T]he common law accepted [Coke’s] views as authoritative.”). 
 169. 2 DE BRACTON, supra note 2, at 341. 
 170. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 656 (Ky. 2004) (“The reason for the 
[born-alive] rule was ‘non constat [it could not be established], whether the child were living at 
the time of the batterie or not, or if the batterie was the cause of death.’” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Sims’s Case, (1601) 75 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.))). 
 171. E.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976) (“Legally and factually, a 
non-viable fetus does not possess the capability for independent existence and has not attained 
the status of independent human life. . . . Until the capability for independent human life is 
attained, there is only the expectancy and potentiality for human life.”), abrogated by People v. 
Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994). 
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as something other than a human life.172 As the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts explained, “An offspring of human parents 
cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human being, and 
therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course outside, the 
womb.”173 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma agreed: 
“[P]roblems in proving causation do not detract from the personhood 
of the victim.”174 
The born-alive rule was thus intentionally underinclusive—the 
killers of some unborn children who deserved punishment went free 
in the interest of protecting others from being wrongfully convicted. 
The rule was a blunt instrument, but in the absence of more advanced 
medical understanding, it was a necessary protection.175 In the modern 
world of ultrasounds, endoscopes, and deeper knowledge of human 
development and causes of death, however, the protections of the 
born-alive standard are no longer necessary.176 The rule is obsolete.177 
Because the born-alive rule was not intended to be a substantive 
definition of “human being,” it can be abandoned without altering the 
scope of existing homicide statutes. Evidence shows that the term 
“human being,” from the time of Bracton, included those who had yet 
to be born.178 Fetuses that were not born alive were only exempted as 
victims under the common law murder statutes because of evidentiary 
obstacles to proving the cause of an unborn child’s death, not because 
they were outside the definition of “human being.” 
 
 172. This interpretation is different from arguing that an unborn child should enjoy the same 
protections as every other human being. The point is simply that an unborn human child is, in 
fact, a human life, whether or not it has been born. 
 173. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984). 
 174. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Cass, 467 N.E.2d 
at 1325). The Massachusetts and Oklahoma courts discussed fetal personhood in the context of 
construing the relevant homicide statutes; whether the courts intended these statements 
regarding personhood to extend beyond the feticide context is immaterial for this Note’s 
purposes. The point is merely that an evidentiary standard does not affect the underlying 
substantive definition. 
 175. Id. (“The born alive rule was necessitated by the state of medical technology in earlier 
centuries.”). 
 176. See id. (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and technology have abolished 
the need for the born alive rule.”). 
 177. E.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“Medical 
science certainly has progressed to the point of making the ‘born alive’ rule obsolete.”); Hughes, 
868 P.2d at 735–36 (“Oklahoma, by means of this decision, joins a minority of two states whose 
courts have expressly rejected the ancient, yet obsolete, born alive rule.”); see also 
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (“[T]he antiquity of a rule is no 
measure of its soundness.”). 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
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Thus, if the major obstacle to classifying feticide as homicide was 
the inability to prove causation,179 and the advance of medical 
technology has since removed that obstacle,180 it stands to reason that 
fetuses are, in fact, potential victims under existing homicide statutes, 
even if those statutes are based on the common law. Claiming that the 
method of proving the causal link between the actus reus and the 
injury affects the definition of the crime itself is not reasonable. 
Considering fetuses to fall within the scope of a common law 
homicide statute does not impermissibly extend the scope of the 
statute, but rather gives fuller effect to the original language. 
Applying a statute more fully and accurately does not, as some courts 
have asserted,181 constitute judicial creation of a new crime. 
One response to this argument is that, whatever the common law 
definition of “human being” actually was, if a legislature enacted a 
homicide statute with the understanding that a fetus was not a 
“human being,” then that statute should not include a fetus in its 
scope. But, to the extent legislative intent is pertinent—and that 
intent was to incorporate the common law—courts should construe 
the statute to actually reflect the common law at the time, rather than 
give effect to the individual legislators’ misunderstanding of the 
common law. 
One telling example is the California Crimes and Punishments 
Act of 1850. Because this act was the California legislature’s first 
attempt to codify common law crimes, the act’s “precedents were 
necessarily drawn from the common law.”182 When construing the 
state’s homicide statute, the California Supreme Court relied on this 
common law foundation to support its assertion that feticide was 
 
 179. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 576. 
 180. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 732 (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and 
technology have abolished the need for the born alive rule.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625–26 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (“For a 
court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section 
187 one who kills an unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the 
guise of construing it.”); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(declining to “redefin[e] . . . the word ‘person’ [because such task] must be left to the legislature, 
which has the primary authority to define crimes”); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 778 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam) (choosing to not recognize fetal homicide because “the 
Legislature had the opportunity to include unborn fetuses in the statute, but did not do so”); 
State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting a proposed expansion of the 
“common law definition of ‘person’ or ‘human being’” in the homicide statute to encompass the 
fetus). 
 182. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619. 
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beyond the scope of the statute because the common law definition of 
human being did not include fetuses.183 
But because the born-alive requirement was not an element of 
the substantive common law definition of human being, the desire to 
exclude a fetus from the protection of the homicide statute should not 
be imputed to the legislature. As the court itself explained, “It will be 
presumed, of course, that in enacting a statute the Legislature was 
familiar with the relevant rules of the common law, and, when it 
couches its enactment in common law language, that its intent was to 
continue those rules in statutory form.”184 Thus, regardless of 
individual legislators’ understanding of the common law definition of 
human being, courts should presume that the legislature as a whole 
intended to codify the actual common law definition. 
B. Why Fetal Homicide Laws Do Not Curtail Reproductive Rights 
Many who oppose feticide legislation do so out of the concern 
that recognizing unborn children as human beings in the homicide 
context will undermine a woman’s constitutional right to an 
abortion.185 Although this concern is not entirely unfounded, it is 
largely misplaced. Because of the sensitive nature of the legal rights 
of unborn children, legislatures—without exception—have 
specifically provided that the fetal homicide statutes are not to be 
construed to in any way obstruct a woman’s right to a legal 
abortion.186 Additionally, some state legislatures have exempted the 
mother of the unborn child from liability under the statute 
altogether.187 Accordingly, not only are these statutes inapplicable in 
the abortion context, but many are inapplicable to any action taken 
by the mother whatsoever. 
In addition to the express protections legislatures have given in 
the statutes, courts have recognized that the consent of the mother is 
the crucial element that distinguishes feticide from abortion. For 
instance, in State v. Holcomb,188 the defendant, convicted of 
murdering a woman and her unborn child, argued that “all intentional 
 
 183. Id. at 622; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 184. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619. 
 185. See supra Part III.B. 
 186. See supra note 154. 
 187. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b) (West 2006). This statute reads, 
“Definitions . . . (b) ‘Whoever’ does not include the pregnant woman.” Id. 
 188. State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
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and unjustified killings of pre-born children must be treated the 
same,” and thus his killing of the unborn child should be treated as an 
abortion rather than a homicide.189 The Missouri Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument outright because “the mother did not consent 
to the actions.”190 Although this holding may seem unexceptional, it 
offers women an additional layer of protection because, in the end, it 
is the subjective intention of the mother that actually controls. 
Consequently, the regime created by enacting fetal homicide 
statutes is one in which the personhood of the fetus is determined 
entirely by the mother’s subjective intent.191 If the mother intends to 
terminate her pregnancy with a legal and controlled abortion, then 
the law would not consider her fetus a person, and the pregnancy 
could be legally ended.192 If, however, the mother desires to carry her 
pregnancy to term, then the law would consider her fetus a person, 
and the protections of the homicide statutes would apply. Though a 
legal fiction, the regime is nevertheless workable. 
So, although fetal homicide laws may seem antithetical to a 
woman’s ability to secure a legal abortion, these statutes actually 
augment a woman’s power to control her reproductive capacity and 
to choose the course of her pregnancy. In the absence of a fetal 
homicide statute, events such as those in Keeler—in which a third 
party intentionally ends a woman’s pregnancy by attacking her 
unborn child—could go unpunished. Thus, fetal homicide laws 
operate as the mirror image to a woman’s right to an abortion: while 
the right to an abortion protects a woman’s choice to end an 
unwanted pregnancy, fetal homicide laws protect a woman’s choice to 
carry a wanted pregnancy to term. In this way, fetal homicide laws 
and abortion rights work as complements, not adversaries. 
Further, the more nebulous argument that the rhetoric of fetal 
homicide laws “will likely color the abortion debate and the legal 
 
 189. Id. at 292. 
 190. Id. 
 191. This may lead to some interesting situations, but is still logically consistent. See, e.g., 
Milligan, supra note 3, at 1178 (“Imagine, for instance, a pregnant woman who approaches an 
abortion clinic with the intention of terminating her pregnancy. In one scenario, she is mugged 
at the entrance, and, due to the ensuing trauma, has a miscarriage. The law holds that a ‘person’ 
was ‘murdered,’ and it punishes the perpetrator with a life sentence in jail. In the second 
scenario, the woman evades the mugger, enters the clinic safely, and undergoes a successful 
abortion procedure. Here the law holds that no crime was committed.”). 
 192. This determination would still be subject to the limitations of Roe v. Wade. 
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battles of the next century”193 is simply not a strong enough concern to 
justify denying women and unborn children the protection of feticide 
statutes. Many staunchly pro-choice scholars agree with this position, 
including Professor Walter Dellinger,194 who has stated, “I don’t think 
[fetal homicide statutes] undermine Roe v. Wade . . . . The legislatures 
can decide that fetuses are deserving of protection without having to 
make any judgment that the entity being protected has freestanding 
constitutional rights.”195 This observation reflects the key attribute 
making fetal homicide and abortion entirely analytically distinct: fetal 
homicide laws govern conduct by third parties against the fetus, 
whereas the right to an abortion governs the relationship between a 
mother and her own unborn child.196 Though both fetal homicide and 
abortion involve the law’s treatment of unborn human beings—an 
emotional topic to be sure—the similarity ends there; the law can 
punish feticide and still protect abortion rights. 
The argument can be cast in terms of cost-benefit analysis: the 
benefits created by protecting a mother’s interest in carrying her 
pregnancy to term, weighed against the costs imposed by the 
potential of fetal homicide laws to (inappropriately) affect the 
abortion debate. But, though a mother’s interest in giving birth to her 
 
 193. Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235. 
 194. Professor Dellinger is a partner at O’Melveny & Myers LLP, a professor of law at 
Duke University School of Law, a former Acting Solicitor General and White House adviser to 
President William Clinton, and a long-time NARAL supporter. 
 195. Anne Blythe, A Question of Rights, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 2003, 
at A21. 
 196. In Lawrence v. State, the Texas court observed, 
The rights and interests addressed by the Roe Court, however, are not the same as 
those at issue in this case. In Roe, the Court was attempting to balance the privacy 
rights of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy with the state’s interest in 
protecting the woman’s health as well as the life of her unborn child. In this case, 
appellant murdered Smith and her unborn child. Obviously, appellant has no 
constitutional right to murder a pregnant woman. The State’s interest in this case is in 
protecting its citizens and their unborn children from murder and imposing maximum 
criminal liability on individuals such as appellant who, by his own criminal conduct, 
terminated Smith’s pregnancy at the same time he ended Smith’s life. Thus, the 
individuals’ and states’ interests at issue in the two cases are clearly distinguishable. 
Lawrence v. State, 211 S.W.3d 883, 891–92 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, the California court 
noted, 
[A] defendant who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death of her fetus, and a 
pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy are not similarly situated. 
“A woman has a privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy; however, defendant 
has no such interest. The statute simply protects the mother and the unborn child 
from the intentional wrongdoing of a third party.” 
People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 103–04 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Ford, 581 
N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). 
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child is fundamental and very real—and the benefits derived from 
protecting that interest are substantial—the costs imposed by fetal 
homicide laws are more speculative in nature. Proponents of the 
slippery slope argument have not described how fetal homicide laws 
affect abortion rights, but instead point to the potential for these laws 
to “color” the abortion debate.197 But, importantly, though the earliest 
fetal homicide statutes were enacted decades ago, nothing indicates 
that they have altered the abortion debate in any significant way. 
In the broad sense that both fetal homicide and abortion involve 
the termination of a pregnancy, the concern that abortion rights could 
be undermined may seem reasonable. But given the benefits of and 
protections provided by fetal homicide laws, it is imprudent to lump 
them together with abortion rights and to fear that the public cannot 
discern the widely divergent contexts in which the issues arise. 
Finally, although the decision to terminate a pregnancy is 
constitutionally protected, the decision to carry a child to term does 
not enjoy such uniform protection. To fully preserve a woman’s 
ability to choose, rather than just her ability to terminate a pregnancy, 
that woman’s choice to give birth should be granted every protection 
afforded to her choice to abort. If the mother’s choice should control, 
the laws of the state should be nothing other than neutral toward her 
decision. If the state protects one choice more completely than the 
other, then the mother’s decision is influenced, and she loses some 
power to choose. 
When a woman elects to have an abortion, the Constitution 
protects her choice against governmental interference—the most 
powerful protection an individual can possess against the state. To be 
consistent, then (if the goal is truly to protect a woman’s right to 
control her pregnancy), it is reasonable to afford a woman who 
chooses to give birth to her unborn child the most powerful 
protection that an individual can possess against other individuals 
because those individuals are the ones who could potentially curtail 
her right to carry the fetus to term.198 That most powerful protection, 
then, is to punish the killing of the fetus as homicide. 
 
 197. See, e.g., Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235 (“[W]hile the Act may not legally 
affect the right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion debate and the legal battles 
of the next century.”). 
 198. This is not to suggest that the law should impose homicide to punish a third party for 
violating a mother’s constitutional right to choose. Rather, the benefit comes from granting a 
woman the ability to determine, solely through her subjective intent, that her fetus is a “person” 
for the purposes of the homicide statute. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. Once a 
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In sum, fetal homicide laws can be harmoniously reconciled with 
a woman’s right to an abortion because the mother’s consent is the 
determining factor. As such, because the mother has the complete 
prerogative to determine whether she wants the pregnancy, her 
reproductive freedoms remain firmly in her hands. Fetal homicide 
laws allow for greater protection against criminal acts without 
requiring the mother to forfeit any rights at all. 
C. Ideal Legislative Framework 
The most complete approach to addressing feticide is through a 
comprehensive regime of fetal homicide laws that specifically define 
the crimes against the unborn and expressly indicate the punishments 
for the offenses. The Minnesota statutes illustrate this approach 
well.199 Although judicial abandonment of the born-alive rule should 
be encouraged—because doing so would bring unborn children within 
the meaning of “human being” in states’ general homicide statutes—
legislative action enables a state to create a comprehensive system of 
feticide-specific laws. Moreover, legislators also can include explicit 
protections in an effort to allay concerns that feticide statutes will 
infringe on women’s constitutional rights.200 
Additionally, given the rationale for classifying the killing of an 
unborn child as homicide, it is arbitrary for lawmakers to distinguish 
between those fetuses that are viable and those that are not. To fully 
protect pregnant mothers and unborn children, fetal homicide laws 
must apply at every stage of gestation. A nonviable fetus is as much a 
human organism as is a viable fetus, and the mother has the same 
interest in protecting the life of her unborn offspring regardless of the 
child’s gestational age. Thus, to be fully effective and theoretically 
sound, the ideal fetal homicide regime should punish equally the 
murder of a previable unborn child and the murder of a full-term 
unborn child. 
The ideal legislative framework for addressing feticide would 
combine the Minnesota and Texas approaches. Minnesota’s approach 
 
mother makes this determination, a third party who kills the fetus can be punished for homicide 
because the third party ended a life that the law treats as a person. For more on the 
justifications for the severity of the punishment, see infra Part IV.D. 
 199. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266–.2691 (West 2006). 
 200. Legislators can, for example, include a provision indicating that the state cannot apply 
the fetal homicide statute in the context of a controlled, legal abortion. E.g., id. § 609.269 
(“Sections 609.2661 to 609.268 [the sections defining the crimes against the unborn] do not apply 
to any act described in section 145.412 [the section defining legal abortion].”). 
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benefits from treating feticide comprehensively, as it includes 
provisions that specifically immunize the mother from liability and 
that make the statutes inapplicable in the abortion context. This 
exhaustive treatment helps to assuage fears raised by abortion rights 
advocates. 
But the Minnesota regime is nevertheless imperfect because it 
defines fetal homicide in separate statutes from the general homicide 
provisions.201 This organization emphasizes the separateness of the 
offenses, even though, as to third parties, the law should not treat 
feticide differently than other homicides. For the sake of theoretical 
soundness, as well as simplicity, the state’s general homicide statute 
should address feticide. 
Texas takes this approach but errs in the opposite direction: it 
defines an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an 
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth,” 
but it does so in the general definitions section that applies to the 
entire penal code.202 Although it is possible to confine this definition 
to only the homicide context by careful use of the term “individual,” 
this approach is also more likely to reach unwanted results by 
inadvertently including the term in an unrelated provision. Thus, to 
reduce the likelihood of errors, statutes should define “individual” or 
“human being” to include a fetus only in those statutory provisions—
like homicide—in which the legislature desires this definition. 
Accordingly, feticide would ideally be covered in a general 
homicide statute that begins by defining “individual” as “a human 
being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of 
gestation from fertilization until birth.”203 The statute would then 
define the crime of homicide in its various degrees. It would also 
include provisions that immunize mothers from liability and make the 
statute inapplicable to legal, controlled abortions. 
D. What about Defendants? 
Thus far, this Note has focused almost exclusively on the victims 
of feticide—the pregnant women and their unborn children. For a 
more complete picture, this Section briefly considers how fetal 
homicide laws affect defendants. 
 
 201. See id. § 609.18–.22 (homicide); id. § 609.2661 (feticide). 
 202. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2008). 
 203. Id. 
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Treating feticide as homicide is a significant judgment that likely 
has severe consequences for defendants. The severity of the 
punishment is primarily justified by the legal personhood bestowed 
on the fetus through the mother’s subjective intent.204 When she alone 
decides that the pregnancy is wanted, fetal homicide laws protect the 
fetus (though the fetus would continue to have no legal personhood 
for any other purpose—specifically, the fetus would not have any 
additional rights against the mother beyond those already granted in 
Roe v. Wade205). Because the fetus’s personhood is tied to the 
mother’s intent, the fetal homicide context remains analytically 
distinct from other instances in which the state seeks to protect 
important interests. Thus, charging a defendant with homicide for 
killing an unborn child is logically sound, even though the penalty 
could be severe. 
Moreover, determining that feticide is legally equivalent to 
homicide would not preordain the punishment for any specific 
defendant. The same gradations of severity that apply in the homicide 
context would continue to apply when the victim is a fetus.206 The 
severity of the punishment would correspond to the defendant’s mens 
rea—thus, sentences would vary depending on whether the defendant 
purposely or knowingly caused the death of the fetus (analogous to 
murder),207 recklessly caused the death of the fetus (analogous to 
manslaughter),208 or only negligently caused the death of the fetus 
(analogous to negligent homicide).209 
This result is intuitive: the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the 
woman’s pregnancy should prevent the defendant from being charged 
with the most severe fetal homicide crime—the fetal homicide 
 
 204. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. 
 205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 206. This discussion is based on the Model Penal Code definitions of mens rea: “Purposely. 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result,” MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(a) (1985); “Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element 
of an offense when . . . if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such result,” id. § 2.02(b); “Recklessly. A person 
acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his 
conduct,” id. § 2.02(c); “Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material 
element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct,” id. § 2.02(d). 
 207. Id. § 210.2. 
 208. Id. § 210.3. 
 209. Id. § 210.4. 
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equivalent of murder. But lack of knowledge should not entirely 
exonerate the defendant from all criminal liability because the 
defendant did, nevertheless, cause the death of the fetus.210 The best 
approach, then, is that the defendant’s level of culpability as to the 
fetus should determine the severity of the fetal homicide crime with 
which the defendant is charged. 
For instance, if the defendant intentionally kills the mother but is 
unaware that she is pregnant, the defendant should be liable for 
murder as to the mother and for manslaughter or negligent homicide 
as to the fetus, depending on whether the facts of the case 
demonstrate that the defendant consciously disregarded the 
possibility of the woman’s pregnancy.211 If the defendant knew that 
the woman was pregnant prior to purposely killing her, the defendant 
should be liable for the most severe crime of homicide as to both the 
mother and the fetus because the defendant knowingly caused both 
deaths.212 
Finally, legislatures can also use sentencing provisions to fine-
tune a fetal homicide punishment depending on the factors that they 
deem relevant. For instance, a legislature could determine that a 
defendant who merely knowingly kills a fetus should be punished less 
harshly than one who purposely does so. Thus, given the potential for 
flexibility, legislatures can enact a functional and fair fetal homicide 
regime using mens rea gradations that are already in place. 
CONCLUSION 
Fetal homicide laws provide powerful protections to both the 
mother and the unborn child without undermining the constitutional 
rights of the mother. By protecting the mother’s decision to bring the 
fetus to term, these laws give fuller effect to the woman’s right to 
 
 210. Because the fetus in this statutory regime would possess personhood for fetal homicide 
purposes, see supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text, the defendant cannot end that fetus’s 
life with immunity. 
 211. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2–.4. Section 210.2 explains that “criminal homicide 
constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id. 
§ 210.2. Section 210.3 explains that “[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is 
committed recklessly.” Id. § 210.3. And section 210.4 explains that “[c]riminal homicide 
constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.” Id. § 210.4. Thus, the severity 
of the defendant’s crime depends on the defendant’s mental state regarding the victim’s 
pregnancy. 
 212. See id. § 210.2 (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is committed 
purposely or knowingly . . . .”). 
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choose. In this way, fetal homicide laws and the constitutionally 
protected right to an abortion are not adversaries; rather, they are 
complements that can be harmoniously reconciled. 
Moreover, the born-alive rule serves no purpose in the modern 
law other than to blindly imitate the past. The rule has simply 
outlived both its necessity and utility, and states should accordingly 
abandon it. Those states that continue to apply the rule and decline to 
extend the scope of homicide statutes to include a fetus as a potential 
homicide victim do their citizens—both born and unborn—an 
injustice. 
In 1970, when the California legislature amended the state 
homicide statute to include the term “fetus,” the state was a maverick, 
blazing a trail away from the accepted notion that homicide laws did 
not apply to the unborn. Over the following decades, other courts and 
legislatures followed suit until, in 1990, feticide was regarded as a 
homicide in nineteen states.213 In that year, however, legislative 
creation of a comprehensive statutory regime to address fetal 
homicide was still seen as “most unusual.”214 As of 2009, thirty-six 
states have classified the killing of an unborn child as homicide. The 
fourteen others that have not ought to bring their laws in line with 
modern understandings of justice by adopting a comprehensive, 
internally consistent statutory regime that incorporates feticide into 
traditional homicide laws. Only in this manner can the law fully 
protect both a mother and her unborn child. 
 
 213. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990). 
 214. Id. 
